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NOTES AND COMMENTS
(2) Where false statements are published by the directors as to the
condition of their bank, a duty to speak the truth is imposed.22
Conclusion
In the principal case, the defendant volunteered positive assertions
of material facts, susceptible of knowledge, with the intention that
the plaintiff act upon them. He knew neither the falsity nor the truth
of his statements. Modern artifical constructions defy detection by
the inexpert examiner. The defendant was a real estate broker, an
expert, while the plaintiff was a mere purchaser of a home. The
defendant was in position to know, and the plaintiff had reasonable
grounds to rely upon the statements of the defendant as importing
verity. It is submitted that under the North Carolina decisions,
liability should have been imposed.2 3 If the North Carolina decisions
are to be so restricted, then the requirement of scienter should be
abolished completely; or, alternatively, liability should be determined
according to the general principles of negligence, for which, our court
has a precedent in its own decisions.
J. GLENN EDWARDS.
Husband and Wfe-Torts-Right of Wife to Sue
Husband for Negligent Injury
Under married women statutes1 permitting married women to
hold all their property of every description for their separate use as
though they were unmarried and permitting them to sue and be sued
as though unmarried, it was held, in an action for personal injury
from the negligent driving of an automobile, that a wife could not
recover from her husband though the action had been started before
the marriage. 2
This would be the result at common law,3 since on marriage the
woman's choses in action may be reduced to possession by the hus-
fidential relationship); Evans v. Davis, 186 N. C. 41, 118 S. E. 845 (1923);
Corley Co. v. Griggs, 192 N. C. 171, 134 S. E. 406 (1926) (scienter not neces-
sary in all cases). But cf. Peyton v. Griffin, 195 N. C. 685, 143 S. E. 525
(1925) (no positive assertion of knowledge) ; (1928) 7 N. C. L. REv. 90, as
to what constitutes reasonable reliance.
'Tate v. Bates, 118 N. C. 287, 24 S. E. 482 (1896) (knowledge presumed
by fiction) ; Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 478 (1896) ; Houston v.
Thornton, 122 N. C. 265, 29 S. E. 827 (1898) (duty to speak truth imposed).
' Supra note 21.
'D. C. CODE (1924) §§1154, 1155.
2 Spector v. Weisman, 40 F. (2d) 792 (Ct. or App. D. C. 1930).
Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa 182 (1875) ; Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q. B. D. 436
(1876) ; Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 309 (1877).
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band and this union in one person of the right-duty relation dis-
charges the duty as a matter of substance, and since the husband has
a right to the services 4 and earnings of the wife she could suffer no
pecuniary loss. There is also the procedural difficulty in that the
husband would be both plaintiff and defendant. The result of this
is usually expressed in the fiction of unity of person and merger of
identity.5 This is a result and not the reason, however, and was not
recognized outside of the common law. It had exceptions even there
in criminal matters. 6
The statutes in question would seem to make applicable the legal
maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa [ex. The courts have
shown a variegated inconsistency in the construction of such statutes.
Some permit a tort action for-a willful injury7 and some will permit
it for a negligent injury.8 The majority will permit a contract
action,9 but not a tort action. 10 The reason seems to be one of policy,
as either line could be logically followed. The court in the principal
'Buckley v. Collier, 1 Salk. 114 (1701) ; Warren, Husband's Right to Wife's
Services (1925) 38 HA~v. L. Rzv. 421, 622.
'1 BL. COMM. (1765) 430-433.
" Queen v. Jackson, 1 Q B. D. 671 (1891) ; State v. Oliver, 70 N. C. 60 (1874)
(assault); State v. Dowell, 106 N. C. 722, 11 S. E. 525, 8 L. R.' A. 297, 19
Am. ST. REP. 568 (1890); State v. Fulton, 149 N. C. 485, 63 S. E. 145 (1908).
" Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185 (1914) ;
Note (1914) 23 YALE L. J. 613; 12 Mica. L. REv. 473; Giliman v. Gillman, 78
N. H. 4, 95 Atl. 657 (1915), Note (1916) 1 CORN. L. Q. 289; Johnson v. John-
son, 201 Ala, 41, 77 So. 335 (1917), Note (1920) 5 CORN. L. Q. 171 (1918) 27
YALE L. J. 1081.
'Bushnell v .Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432, 44 A. L. R. 785 (1925),
Note (1926) 24 MicH. L. REv. 618; 10 MiNN. L. REv. 439; 1 Noran DAME
LAW. 195; Waite v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475, 48 A. L. R. 276
(1926) ; Note (1926) 4 Wis. L. RZEv. 37; 26 COL. L. REV. 895; 12 IowA L. RFv.
93; 11 MiN. L. REv. 79; 11 MARaUETrs L. Rnv. 55.
'Adams v. Custis, 4 Lans. 164 (N. Y. 1870) ; Benson v. Morgan, 50 Mich.
77, 14 N. W. 705 (1883) ; Kennedy v. Knight, 174 Pa. 408, 34 Atl. 585 (1896);
DeBaun v. DeBaun, 119 Va. 85, 89 S. E. 239 (1916).10Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S. W. 628 (1915), L. R. A.
1916 B 881 (assault and battery) ; Woltman v. Woltman, 153 Minn. 217, 189
N. W. 1022 (1922). Note (1923) 21 MicH. L. REv. 473 (negligence); Newton
v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N. Y. Supp. 113 (1922); Note (1922) 36 HARV.
L. REV. 346, 32 YALE L. J. 196 (negligence); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61,
100 So. 591 (1924) ; Note (1924) 19 ILL. L. REv. 198 (negligence) ; Allen v.
Allen; 246 N. Y. 571, 159 N. E. 656 (1927) ; Note (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 834; 28
COL. L. REV. 818. But cf. Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253,
164 N. E. 42 (1928) (permits husband's employer to be held liable, although
the husband himself is not liable and thus shows N. Y. to be interpreting
the statute on grounds of policy). Contra: Maine v. Maine & Sons Co., 198
Iowa 1278, 201 N. W. 20, 37 A. L. R. 161.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
case felt bound by an earlier decision"1 which denied the right
through fear of disturbing the harmony of the home and due to a
strict construction of the statute, since it was in derogation of the
common law. That decision left the wife with a remedy in the
divorce court and in the criminal court, but such a right is not here
presented, as this is a negligent injury and not a willful one.
North Carolina and Wisconsin have adopted the liberal construc-
tion of their married women acts and permit tort actions by the wife,
whether the injury is willful' 2 or negligent.' 3 New York, on the
other hand, under a similar statute has refused the tort action.' 4
It is submitted that the right of action should not be denied the
wife because of vague public policy based on a priori reasoning which
experience in other states has demonstrated to be unfounded. The
married women statutes are remedial in character and should be lib-
erally construed. 15 There should be no procedural limitations on
married women, as such. Instead, the right of a married woman to
recover against her husband should be governed by reasonable limita-
tions of substantive law, consistent with the relation of the parties.' 6
HuGH BRowN CAMPBELL.
Judgments--Setting Aside judgment for Neglect of Attorney
Not Residing in County of Trial
In a recent North Carolina case plaintiff instituted suit in Ashe
County against defendant who lived in Gaston County. Defendant
filed a verified answer but neither he nor his attorney appeared for
trial. Judgment was rendered against defendant. Under §600 of
"Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct. 111, 54 L. ed. 1180, 30
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1153, 21 ANN. CAS. 921 (1910); Note (1913) 22 YALE L. J.
250; 9 MIcH. L. REv. 440 (It is to be noted that the remarks concerning prop-
erty actions are against the great weight of authority).
" Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206 (1920), 181 N. C. 66, 106
S. E. 149 (1921) ; Note (1921) 19 MicH. L. REv. 659, 7 VA. L. REV. 476.
"Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9, 29 A. L. R. 1479 (1923);
Note (1923) 33 YALE L. J. 315, 2 N. C. LAw REv. 113, 10 VA. L. REV. 161;
Waite v. Pierce, supra note 8; Earle v. Earle, 198 N. C. 411, 151 S. E. 884(1930).
1 "Newton v. Weber, mspra note 10. It is to be noted that the N. C. statute
does not expressly permit the wife to sue her husband in tort but such a result
is derived by construction only. N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §§454, 2506,
2513.
,BLACK, INTERPRETATION OF LAws (2d ed. 1911) 375-378.
1 See Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23, 37, 63 AtL. 285, 287, 5 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 611 (1906) ; Brown v. Brown, supra note 7. For excellent treatment
of the subject see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation(1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030.
